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ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS: TRADING PARTNERS AND
TRADING VOLUMES*
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MARC MELITZ
YONA RUBINSTEIN
We develop a simple model of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms
that is consistent with a number of stylized features of the data. In particular, the
model predicts positive as well as zero trade ﬂows across pairs of countries, and
it allows the number of exporting ﬁrms to vary across destination countries. As
a result, the impact of trade frictions on trade ﬂows can be decomposed into the
intensive and extensive margins, where the former refers to the trade volume per
exporter and the latter refers to the number of exporters. This model yields a gen-
eralized gravity equation that accounts for the self-selection of ﬁrms into export
markets and their impact on trade volumes. We then develop a two-stage estima-
tion procedure that uses an equation for selection into trade partners in the ﬁrst
stage and a trade ﬂow equation in the second. We implement this procedure para-
metrically, semiparametrically, and nonparametrically, showing that in all three
cases the estimated effects of trade frictions are similar. Importantly, our method
provides estimates of the intensive and extensive margins of trade. We show that
traditional estimates are biased and that most of the bias is due not to selection
but rather due to the omission of the extensive margin. Moreover, the effect of the
number of exporting ﬁrms varies across country pairs according to their charac-
teristics. This variation is large and particularly so for trade between developed
and less developed countries and between pairs of less developed countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Estimation of international trade ﬂows has a long tradi-
tion. Tinbergen (1962) pioneered the use of gravity equations in
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empirical speciﬁcations of bilateral trade ﬂows in which the vol-
ume of trade between two countries is proportional to the product
of an index of their economic size, and the factor of proportion-
ality depends on measures of “trade resistance” between them.
Among the measures of trade resistance, he included geographic
distance, a dummy for common borders, and dummies for Com-
monwealth and Benelux memberships. Tinbergen’s speciﬁcation
has been widely used, simply because it provides a good ﬁt to most
data sets of regional and international trade ﬂows. And over time,
his approach has been supplemented with theoretical underpin-
ningsandbetterestimationtechniques.1 Thegravityequationhas
dominated empirical research in international trade; it has been
used to estimate the impact on trade ﬂows of international bor-
ders, preferential trading blocs, currency unions, and membership
in the WTO, as well as the size of home-market effects.2
All the above-mentioned studies estimate the gravity equa-
tion on samples of countries that have only positive trade ﬂows
between them. We argue in this paper that, by disregarding coun-
triesthatdonottradewitheachother,thesestudiesgiveupimpor-
tant information contained in the data, and they produce biased
estimates as a result. We also argue that standard speciﬁcations
of the gravity equation impose symmetry that is inconsistent with
the data and that this too biases the estimates. To correct these
biases, we develop a theory that predicts positive as well as zero
trade ﬂows between countries and use the theory to derive esti-
mation procedures that exploit the information contained in data
sets of trading and nontrading countries alike.3
The next section brieﬂy reviews the evolution of the volume of
trade among the 158 countries in our sample and the composition
of country pairs according to their trading status.4 Three features
stand out. First, about half of the country pairs do not trade with
1. See, for example, Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985),
Helpman (1987), Feenstra (2002), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
2. SeeMcCallum(1995)forthestudythattriggeredanextensivedebateonthe
role of international borders, as well as Wei (1996), and Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), and Evans (2003). Feenstra (2003, Chap. 5) provides an overview of this
debate. Also, see Frankel (1997) on preferential trading blocs, Rose (2000) and
Tenreyro and Barro (2003) on currency unions, Rose (2004) on WTO membership,
and Davis and Weinstein (2003) on the size of home-market effects.
3. Evenett and Venables (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), and Have-
man and Hummels (2004) all highlight the prevalence of zero bilateral trade ﬂows
and suggest theoretical interpretations for them. We provide a theoretical frame-
work that jointly determines both the set of trading partners and their trade
volumes, and we develop estimation procedures for this model.
4. See Appendix I for data sources.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 443
one another.5 Second, the rapid growth of world trade from 1970 to
1997 was predominantly due to the growth of the volume of trade
among countries that traded with each other in 1970 rather than
due to the expansion of trade among new trade partners.6 Third,
the average volume of trade at the end of the period between
pairs of countries that exported to one another in 1970 was much
larger than the average volume of trade at the end of the period of
country pairs that did not. Nevertheless, we show in Section VI
that the volume of trade between pairs of countries that traded
with one another was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the fraction of
ﬁrms that engaged in foreign trade and that this fraction varied
systematically with country characteristics. Therefore the inten-
sive margin of trade was substantially driven by variations in the
fraction of trading ﬁrms but not by new trading partners.7
We develop in Section III the theoretical model that moti-
vates our estimation procedures. This is a model of international
trade in differentiated products in which ﬁrms face ﬁxed and vari-
able costs of exporting, along the lines suggested by Melitz (2003).
Firms vary by productivity, and only the more productive ﬁrms
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export. Moreover, the proﬁtability of exports
varies by destination; it is higher for exports to countries with
higher demand levels, lower variable export costs, and lower ﬁxed
export costs. Positive trade ﬂows from country j to country i thus
aggregate exports over varying distributions of ﬁrms. Each dis-
tribution is bounded by a marginal exporter in j who just breaks
even by exporting to i. Country j ﬁrms with higher productivity
levels generate positive proﬁts from exports to i.
Thismodelhasanumberofimplicationsfortradeﬂows.First,
no ﬁrm from country j may be productive enough to proﬁtably
export to country i. The model is therefore able to predict zero
exports from j to i for some country pairs. As a result, the model
isconsistentwithzerotradeﬂowsinbothdirectionsbetween some
countries, as well as zero exports from j to i but positive exports
5. We say that a country pair i and j do not trade with one another if i does
n o te x p o r tt oj and j does not export to i.
6. Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) report that prior to 1970 new trade ﬂows
contributed substantially to the growth of world trade.
7. The role of the number of exported products, as opposed to exports per prod-
uct, has been found to be important in a number of studies. To illustrate, Hummels
and Klenow (2005) ﬁnd that 60% of the greater export of larger economies in their
sample of 126 exporting countries is due to variation in the number of exported
products, and Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) ﬁnd that during episodes of trade liberal-
ization in 18 countries a large fraction of trade expansion was driven by trade in
goods that were not traded before.444 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
from i to j for some country pairs. Both types of trade patterns
exist in the data. Second, the model predicts positive—though
asymmetric—tradeﬂowsinbothdirectionsforsomecountrypairs,
which are also needed to explain the data. And ﬁnally, the model
generates a gravity equation.
Our derivation of the gravity equation generalizes the
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) equation in two ways. First,
it accounts for ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁxed trade costs and thus
predicts an extensive margin for trade ﬂows. Second, it accounts
for asymmetries between the volume of exports from j to i and the
volumeofexportsfromi to j.Bothareimportantfordataanalysis.
We also develop a set of sufﬁcient conditions under which more
general forms of the Anderson–van Wincoop equations aggregate
trade ﬂows across heterogeneous ﬁrms facing both ﬁxed and vari-
able trade costs.
Section IV develops the empirical framework for estimating
the gravity equation derived in Section III. We propose a two-
stage estimation procedure. The ﬁrst stage consists of estimating
a Probit equation that speciﬁes the probability that country j ex-
ports to i as a function of observable variables. The speciﬁcation of
this equation is derived from the theoretical model and an explicit
introduction of unobservable variations. Predicted components of
this equation are then used in the second stage to estimate the
gravity equation in log-linear form. We show that this procedure
yields consistent estimates of the parameters of the gravity equa-
tion, such as the marginal impact of distance between countries
on their exports to one another.8 It simultaneously corrects for
two types of potential biases: a sample selection bias and a bias
from potential asymmetries in the trade ﬂows between pairs of
countries. The latter bias is due to an omitted variable that mea-
sures the impact of the number (fraction) of exporting ﬁrms, that
is, the extensive margin of trade. Because this procedure is easy
to implement, it can be effectively used in many applications.
Our theoretical model has ﬁrm heterogeneity, yet we do not
need ﬁrm-level data to estimate the gravity equation. This prop-
erty results from the fact that the characteristics of the marginal
exporters to different destinations can be identiﬁed from the vari-
ation in features of the destination countries and of observable
bilateral trade costs. As a result, there exist sufﬁcient statistics,
8. We also show that consistency requires the use of separate country ﬁxed
effects for exporters and importers, as proposed by Feenstra (2002).ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 445
which can be computed from aggregate data, that predict the se-
lection of heterogeneous ﬁrms into export markets and their asso-
ciated aggregate trade volumes.9 This is an important advantage
of our approach, which extracts from country-level data informa-
tion that would normally require ﬁrm-level data. Although more
ﬁrm-level data sets have become available over time, it is not yet
possible to pool them together into a comprehensive data set that
can be used for cross-country estimation purposes.
Section V shows that variables that are commonly used in
gravity equations also affect the probability that two countries
trade with each other. This provides evidence for a potential bias
in the standard estimates. The extent of this bias is then studied
in Sections VI and VII. In Section VI, we estimate the model on a
partial sample of countries for which we have data on regulation
of entry costs, which we use as the excluded variables in the two-
stage estimation procedure. We argue that these variables satisfy
the exclusion restrictions on theoretical grounds. In Section VII,
we use this reduced sample to test for the validity of other po-
tential excluded variables, which are available for virtually all
country pairs, representing a substantial increase in sample size.
We show that an index for common religion (across country pairs)
satisﬁes the exclusion restrictions for this sample. We then reesti-
mate our model on the full sample of countries using this common
religion index as the excluded variable. This approximately dou-
bles the number of usable observations. This substantial increase
in sample size is the main motivation behind our construction of
the religion variable in the ﬁrst place.
In both Sections VI and VII, we implement three estimation
methods, progressively relaxing some parameterization assump-
tions: nonlinear least squares, semiparametric, and nonparame-
tric. The nonlinear least squares (NLS) version of the two-stage
procedure uses functional forms derived from the theoretical
model under the assumption that productivity follows a truncated
Pareto distribution. We show that the corrections for the selection
9. Eaton and Kortum (2002) apply a similar principle to determine an aggre-
gate gravity equation across heterogeneous Ricardian sectors. As in our model,
the predicted trade volume reﬂects an extensive margin (number of sectors/goods
traded) and an intensive one (volume of trade per good/sector). However, Eaton
and Kortum do not model ﬁxed trade costs and the possibility of zero bilateral
trade ﬂows. Unlike our equations, theirs are subject to the criticism raised by
Haveman and Hummels (2004). Bernard et al. (2003) use direct information
on U.S. plant-level sales, productivity, and export status to calibrate a model
that is then used to simulate the extensive and intensive margins of bilateral
trade ﬂows.446 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and omitted variable biases have a measurable downward impact
on the estimated coefﬁcients. Moreover, the extent of this bias
is not sensitive to the use of the alternative excluded variables.
The nature and extent of this bias is further conﬁrmed when we
estimate the model in the other two alternative ways: ﬁrst with a
semiparametric method, where we replace the truncated Pareto
distribution for ﬁrm productivity with a general distribution ap-
proximated by a polynomial ﬁt, and second with a nonparametric
method, which further relaxes the joint normality assumption for
the unobserved trade costs. In both cases, we obtain results very
similar to our fully parametrized NLS speciﬁcation. An additional
advantage of the latter two methods is that they can be easily
implemented using OLS in the second stage.
A number of additional insights from our estimates are dis-
cussed in Section VIII. First, we show that most of the bias is due
to the omitted correction for the extensive margin of trade and
not due to the selection bias. In fact, the selection bias is economi-
cally negligible though statistically (strongly) signiﬁcant. Second,
we show that the asymmetric impact of the extensive margin of
trade is important in explaining the asymmetries in trade ﬂows
observed in the data. Finally, we show that the biases not only
are large, but also systematically vary with the characteristics of
trade partners. For this purpose we perform a counterfactual ex-
ercise in which trade frictions are reduced. A reduction in these
frictions induces trade among country pairs that did not trade be-
fore and raises trade volumes among country pairs with existing
trade relations. When countries are partitioned by income (high
versus low), we ﬁnd that the impact of reduced trade frictions dif-
fers substantially across country pairs according to these income
levels. The elasticity of trade with respect to such frictions can
vary by a factor of three. That is, it can be three times larger for
some country pairs than for others. This highlights both the size,
and also the large variations in the biases across country pairs.
Section IX concludes.
II. A GLANCE AT THE DATA
Figure I depicts the empirical extent of zero trade ﬂows. In
this ﬁgure, all possible country pairs are partitioned into three
categories. The top portion represents the fraction of country pairs
that do not trade with one another; the bottom portion represents
those that trade in both directions (they export to one another);ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 447
FIGURE I
Distribution of Country Pairs Based on Direction of Trade
Note. Constructed from 158 countries.
andthemiddleportionrepresentsthosethattradeinonedirection
only (one country imports from, but does not export to, the other
country). As is evident from the ﬁgure, by disregarding countries
that do not trade with each other or trade only in one direction,
one disregards close to half of the observations. We show below
that these observations contain useful information for estimating
international trade ﬂows.10
Figure II shows the evolution of the aggregate real volume of
exports of all 158 countries in our sample and of the aggregate
real volume of exports of the subset of country pairs that exported
to one another in 1970. The difference between the two curves
represents the volume of trade of country pairs that either did not
trade or traded in one direction only in 1970. It is clear from this
ﬁgure that the rapid growth of trade, at an annual rate of 7.5%
on average, was mostly driven by the growth of trade between
countries that traded with each other in both directions at the
beginning of the period. In other words, the contribution to the
10. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) also argue that zero trade ﬂows can be used in
the estimation of the gravity equation, but they emphasize a heteroscedasticity
bias that emanates from the log-linearization of the equation rather than the
selection and asymmetry biases that we emphasize. Moreover, the Poisson method
that they propose to use yields similar estimates on the sample of countries that
have positive trade ﬂows in both directions and the sample of countries that have
positive and zero trade ﬂows. This ﬁnding is consistent with our ﬁnding that the
selection bias is rather small.448 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE II
Aggregate Volume of Exports of All Country Pairs and of Country Pairs That
Traded in Both Directions in 1970
growth of trade of countries that started to trade after 1970 in
either one or both directions was relatively small.
Combining this evidence with the evidence from Figure I,
which shows a relatively slow growth of the fraction of trading
country pairs, suggests that bilateral trading volumes of coun-
try pairs that traded with one another in both directions at the
beginning of the period must have been much larger than the bi-
lateral trading volumes of country pairs that either did not trade
with each other or traded in one direction only at the beginning of
the period. Indeed, at the end of the period the average bilateral
trade volume of country pairs of the former type was about 35
times larger than the average bilateral trade volume of country
pairs of the latter type. This suggests that the enlargement of the
set of trading countries did not contribute in a major way to the
growth of world trade.11
11. This contrasts with the sector-level evidence presented by Evenett and
Venables(2002).Theyﬁndasubstantialincreaseinthenumberoftradingpartners
at the three-digit sector level for a selected group of 23 developing countries. We
conjecture that their country sample is not representative and that most of their
new trading pairs were originally trading in other sectors. And this also contrastsESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 449
III. THEORY
Consider a world with J countries, indexed by j = 1,2,...,J.
Every country consumes and produces a continuum of products.
Country j’s utility function is
uj =
  
l∈Bj
xj(l)αdl
 1/α
,0 <α<1,
where xj(l) is its consumption of product l and Bj is the set of
products available for consumption in country j. The parameter
α determines the elasticity of substitution across products, which
is ε = 1/(1 − α). This elasticity is the same in every country.
Let Yj be the income of country j, which equals its expendi-
ture level. Then country j’s demand for product l is
(1) xj (l) =
˘ pj (l)
−ε Yj
P
1−ε
j
,
where ˘ pj(l) is the price of product l in country j and Pj is the
country’s ideal price index, given by
(2) Pj =
  
l∈Bj
˘ pj(l)1−εdl
 1/(1−ε)
.
This speciﬁcation implies that every product has a constant de-
mand elasticity ε.
Some of the products consumed in country j are domestically
produced while others are imported. Country j has a measure Nj
of ﬁrms, each one producing a distinct product. The products pro-
duced by country-j ﬁrms are also distinct from the products pro-
duced by country-i ﬁrms for i  = j. As a result, there are
 J
j=1 Nj
products in the world economy.
A country-j ﬁrm produces one unit of output with a cost-
minimizing combination of inputs that cost cja, where a mea-
sures the number of bundles of the country’s inputs used by the
ﬁrm per unit output and cj measures the cost of this bundle. The
cost cj is country-speciﬁc, reﬂecting differences across countries
in factor prices, whereas a is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, reﬂecting productivity
with the ﬁnding that changes in the number of trading products has a measurable
impact on trade ﬂows (see Kehoe and Ruhl [2002] and Hummels and Klenow
[2005]).450 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
differences across ﬁrms in the same country. The inverse of a,1 /a,
represents the ﬁrm’s productivity level.12 We assume that a cu-
mulativedistributionfunction G(a)withsupport[aL,aH]describes
the distribution of a across ﬁrms, where aH > aL > 0. This distri-
bution function is the same in all countries.13
We assume that a producer bears only production costs when
selling in the home market. That is, if a country-j producer with
coefﬁcient a sells in country j, the delivery cost of its product is
cja. If, however, this same producer seeks to sell its product in
country i, there are two additional costs it has to bear: a ﬁxed
cost of serving country i, which equals cj fij, and a transport cost.
As is customary, we adopt the “melting iceberg” speciﬁcation and
assume that τij units of a product have to be shipped from country
j to i for one unit to arrive. We assume that fjj = 0 for every j
and fij > 0f o ri  = j,a n dτjj = 1 for every j and τij > 1f o ri  = j.
Note that the ﬁxed cost coefﬁcients fij and the transport cost
coefﬁcients τij depend on the identity of the importing and export-
ing countries, but not on the identity of the exporting producer.
In particular, they do not depend on the producer’s productivity
level.
There is monopolistic competition in ﬁnal products. Because
every producer of a distinct product is of measure zero, the de-
mand function (1) implies that a country-j producer with an
input coefﬁcient a maximizes proﬁts by charging the mill price
pj(a) = cja/α. This is a standard markup pricing equation, with a
smaller markup associated with a larger elasticity of demand. If
thiscountry-j producerofaproductl sellstoconsumersincountry
i, it then sets a delivered price (in country i) equal to
(3) ˘ pj (l) = τij
cja
α
.
As a result, the associated operating proﬁts from these sales to
country i are
πij(a) = (1 − α)
 
τijcja
αPi
 1−ε
Yi − cj fij.
12. See Melitz (2003) for a discussion of a general equilibrium model of trad-
ing countries in which ﬁrms are heterogeneous in productivity. We follow his
speciﬁcation.
13. The a’s only capture relative productivity differences across ﬁrms in a
country. Aggregate productivity differences across countries are subsumed in the
cj’s.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 451
Evidently, these operating proﬁts are positive for sales in the do-
mestic market because fjj = 0. Therefore all Nj producers sell in
country j. But sales in country i  = j are proﬁtable only if a ≤ aij,
where aij is deﬁned by πij(aij) = 0, or14
(4) (1 − α)
 
τijcjaij
αPi
 1−ε
Yi = cj fij.
It follows that only a fraction G(aij) of country j’s Nj ﬁrms ex-
port to country i. For this reason the set Bi of products available
in country i is smaller than the total set of products produced
in the world economy. In addition, it is possible for G(aij)t ob e
zero: no ﬁrm from country j ﬁnds it proﬁtable to export to country
i. This happens whenever aij ≤ aL: the least productive ﬁrm that
can proﬁtably export to country i has a coefﬁcient abelow the sup-
port of G(a). We explicitly consider these cases that explain zero
bilateral trade volumes. If aij were larger than aH, then all ﬁrms
from country j would export to i. However, given the pervasive
ﬁrm-level evidence on the coexistence of exporting and nonex-
porting ﬁrms, even within narrowly deﬁned sectors, we disregard
this possibility.
We next characterize bilateral trade volumes. Let
(5) Vij =
   aij
aL a1−εdG(a) for aij ≥ aL
0 otherwise.
The demand function (1) and pricing equation (3) then imply that
the value of country i’s imports from j is
(6) Mij =
 
cjτij
αPi
 1−ε
YiNjVij.
This bilateral trade volume equals zero when aij ≤ aL, because
Vij = 0 under these circumstances. Using the deﬁnition of Vij and
(2), we also obtain
(7) P
1−ε
i =
J  
j=1
 cjτij
α
 1−ε
NjVij.
14. Note that aij →+ ∞as fij → 0.452 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Equations (4)–(7) provide a mapping from the income levels Yi,
the numbers of ﬁrms Ni, the unit costs ci, the ﬁxed costs fij,a n d
the transport costs τij to the bilateral trade ﬂows Mij.
We show in Appendix II that, together with equality of in-
come and expenditure, equations (4)–(7) can be used to derive a
generalized version of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) gravity
equation with third-country effects. This generalization applies
when transport costs are symmetric (τij = τji ∀i, j)a n dVij can
be multiplicatively decomposed into three components: one that
depends only on importer characteristics, a second that depends
only on exporter characteristics, and a third that depends on the
countrypaircharacteristicsbutissymmetricforthatcountrypair.
This decomposability holds in Anderson and van Wincoop’s model.
Importantly, however, there are other cases of interest with pos-
itive ﬁxed export costs and an extensive margin of trade that
also satisfy the generalized gravity equation. Yet even this more
generalized version of the gravity equation cannot explain the
documented pattern of zero trade ﬂows and the bilateral trade
asymmetries (see Appendix II for details). Thus, in order to gain
as much ﬂexibility as possible in the empirical application, we
develop in the next section an estimation procedure that builds
directly on equations (4)–(7), which allow for asymmetric bilateral
trade ﬂows, including zeros.
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We begin by formulating a fully parametrized estimation pro-
cedure for this model, which delivers our benchmark results. We
then progressively loosen these parametric restrictions and re-
estimate the model. In all cases, we obtain similar results that
are consistent with the analysis of the baseline scenario.
In the baseline speciﬁcation, we assume that ﬁrm productiv-
ity 1/a is Pareto distributed, truncated to the support [aL,aH].
Thus, we assume G(a) = (ak − ak
L)/(ak
H − ak
L), k > (ε − 1). As previ-
ously highlighted, we allow for aij < aL for some i–j pairs, induc-
ing zero exports from j to i (i.e., Vij = 0a n dMij = 0). This frame-
work also allows for asymmetric trade ﬂows, Mij  = Mji,w h i c h
may also be unidirectional, with Mji > 0a n dMij = 0, or Mji = 0
and Mij > 0. Such unidirectional trading relationships are empir-
ically common and can be predicted using our empirical method.
Moreover, asymmetric trade frictions are not necessary to induce
such asymmetric trade ﬂows when productivity is drawn from a
truncated Pareto distribution.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 453
Our assumptions imply that Vij can be expressed as (see (5))
Vij =
ka
k−ε+1
L
(k− ε + 1)
 
ak
H − ak
L
 Wij,
where
(8) Wij = max
  
aij
aL
 k−ε+1
− 1,0
 
,
and aij is determined by the zero proﬁt condition (4). Note that
both Vij and Wij are monotonic functions of the proportion of ex-
porters from j to i, G(aij). The export volume from j to i, given by
(6), can now be expressed in log-linear form as
mij = (ε − 1)lnα − (ε − 1)lncj + nj + (ε − 1) pi + yi
+(1 − ε)lnτij + vij,
where lowercase variables represent the natural logarithms of
their respective uppercase variables. τij captures variable trade
costs: costs that affect the volume of ﬁrm-level exports. We as-
sume that these costs are stochastic due to i.i.d. unmeasured
trade frictions uij, which are country-pair speciﬁc. In particular,
let τ
ε−1
ij ≡ D
γ
ije−uij, where Dij represents the (symmetric) distance
between i and j,a n duij ∼ N(0,σ2
u).15 Then the equation of the
bilateral trade ﬂows mij yields the estimating equation
(9) mij = β0 + λj + χi − γdij + wij + uij,
where χi = (ε − 1)pi + yi is a ﬁxed effect of the importing coun-
try and λj =− (ε − 1)lncj + nj is a ﬁxed effect of the exporting
country.16
Equation (9) highlights several important differences with
the gravity equation, as derived, for example, by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003). The most important difference is the addi-
tion in our formulation of the new variable wij, which controls for
the fraction of ﬁrms (possibly zero) that export from j to i. This
15. In the following derivations, we use distance as the only source of ob-
servable variable trade costs. It should nevertheless be clear how this approach
generalizes to a matrix of observable bilateral trade frictions paired with a vector
of elasticities γ.
16. We replace vij with wij, and therefore β0 now also contains the log of
the constant multiplier in Vij. If tariffs are not directly controlled for, then the
importer’s ﬁxed effect will subsume an average tariff level. Similarly, average
export taxes will show up in the exporter’s ﬁxed effect.454 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
variable is a function of the cutoff aij, which is determined by
other explanatory variables (see (4)). When wij is not included on
the right-hand side, the coefﬁcient γ on distance (or any other co-
efﬁcient on a potential trade barrier) can no longer be interpreted
as the elasticity of a ﬁrm’s trade with respect to distance (or other
trade barriers), which is the way in which such trade barriers are
almost always modeled in the literature that follows the “new”
trade theory. Instead, the estimation of the standard gravity equa-
tionconfoundstheeffectsoftradebarriersonﬁrm-leveltradewith
their effects on the proportion of exporting ﬁrms, which induces
an upward bias in the estimated coefﬁcient γ.
Another bias is introduced into the estimation of equation
(9) when country pairs with zero trade ﬂows are excluded. This
selection effect induces a positive correlation between the unob-
served uij’s and the trade barrier, dij’s; country pairs with large
observed trade barriers (high dij) that trade with each other are
likely to have low unobserved trade barriers (high uij). Although
this induces a downward bias in the trade barrier coefﬁcient, our
empirical results show that this effect is dominated by the upward
bias generated by the endogenous number of exporters.
Last, we emphasize again that in our formulation, bilateral
trade ﬂows need not be balanced, even when all bilateral trade
barriers are symmetric. First and foremost, wij can be asymmet-
ric. We document later in Section VIII that such asymmetries are
empirically important and substantial. Second, the importer ﬁxed
effects may differ from the exporter ﬁxed effects for given coun-
tries. This substantiates the use of directional trade ﬂows and sep-
arate ﬁxed effects for the exporting and the importing countries.
IV.A. Firm Selection into Export Markets
The selection of ﬁrms into export markets, represented by
the variable Wij, is determined by the cutoff value of aij,w h i c h
is implicitly deﬁned by the zero proﬁt condition (4). We deﬁne a
related latent variable Zij as
(10) Zij =
(1 − α)
 
Pi
α
cjτij
 ε−1
Yia
1−ε
L
cj fij
.
This is the ratio of variable export proﬁts for the most pro-
ductive ﬁrm (with productivity 1/aL) to the ﬁxed export costs
(common to all exporters) for exports from j to i. Positive ex-
ports are observed if and only if Zij > 1. In this case Wij is aESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 455
monotonic function of Zij;t h a ti s ,Wij = Z
(k−ε+1)/(ε−1)
ij − 1 (see (4)
and (8)). As with the variable trade costs τij, we assume that
the ﬁxed export costs fij are stochastic due to unmeasured trade
frictions νij that are i.i.d., but may be correlated with the uij’s.
Let fij ≡ exp(φEX,j + φIM,i + κφij − νij), where νij ∼ N(0,σ2
ν ), φIM,i
is a ﬁxed trade barrier imposed by the importing country on all
exporters, φEX,j is a measure of ﬁxed export costs common across
all export destinations, and φij is an observed measure of any ad-
ditional country-pair speciﬁc ﬁxed trade costs.17 Using this speci-
ﬁcation together with (ε − 1)lnτij ≡ γdij − uij, the latent variable
zij ≡ ln Zij can be expressed as
(11) zij = γ0 + ξj + ζi − γdij − κφij + ηij,
where ηij ≡ uij + νij ∼ N(0,σ2
u + σ2
ν ) is i.i.d. (yet correlated with
the error term uij in the gravity equation), ξj =− εlncj + φEX,j
is an exporter ﬁxed effect, and ζi = (ε − 1)pi + yi − φIM,i is an im-
porter ﬁxed effect. Although zij is unobserved, we observe the
presence of trade ﬂows. Therefore zij > 0w h e nj exports to i, and
zij = 0 when it does not. Moreover, the value of zij affects the
export volume.
Deﬁne the indicator variable Tij to equal 1 when country j
exports to i and 0 when it does not. Let ρij be the probability
that j exports to i, conditional on the observed variables. Because
we do not want to impose σ2
η ≡ σ2
u + σ2
ν = 1, we divide (11) by the
standard deviation ση and specify the Probit equation
ρij = Pr(Tij = 1 | observed variables)
=  
 
γ ∗
0 + ξ∗
j + ζ∗
i − γ ∗dij − κ∗φij
 
, (12)
where  (·) is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution, and every
starred coefﬁcient represents the original coefﬁcient divided by
ση.18 Importantly, this selection equation has been derived from
a ﬁrm-level decision, and it therefore does not contain the unob-
served and endogenous variable Wij that is related to the fraction
of exporting ﬁrms. Moreover, the Probit equation can be used to
derive consistent estimates of Wij.
17. As with variable trade costs, it should be clear how this derivation can be
extended to a vector of observable ﬁxed trade costs.
18. Byconstruction,theerrortermη∗
ij ≡ ηij/ση isdistributedunitnormal.The
Probit equation (12) distinguishes between observable trade barriers that affect
variable trade costs (dij) and ﬁxed trade costs ( fij). In practice, some variables
may affect both. Their coefﬁcients in (12) then capture the combined effect of these
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Let ˆ ρij bethepredictedprobabilityofexportsfrom j toi,using
the estimates from the Probit equation (12), and let ˆ z∗
ij =  −1(ˆ ρij)
be the predicted value of the latent variable z∗
ij ≡ zij/ση. Then a
consistent estimate for Wij can be obtained from
(13) Wij = max
  
Z∗
ij
 δ − 1,0
 
,
where δ ≡ ση(k− ε + 1)/(ε − 1).
IV.B. Consistent Estimation of the Log-Linear Equation
Consistent estimation of (9) requires controls for both the en-
dogenousnumberofexporters(viawij)andtheselectionofcountry
pairsintotradingpartners(whichgeneratesacorrelationbetween
the unobserved uij and the independent variables). We thus need
estimates for E[wij | .,Tij = 1] and E[uij | .,Tij = 1]. Both terms
depend on ¯ η∗
ij ≡ E[η∗
ij | .,Tij = 1]. Moreover, E[uij | .,Tij = 1] =
corr(uij,η ij)(σu/ση)¯ η∗
ij.S i n c eη∗
ij has a unit normal distribution,
a consistent estimate ˆ ¯ η∗
ij is obtained from the inverse Mills ratio,
that is, ˆ ¯ η∗
ij = φ(ˆ z∗
ij)/ (ˆ z∗
ij). Therefore ˆ ¯ z∗
ij ≡ ˆ z∗
ij + ˆ ¯ η∗
ij is a consistent
estimate for E[z∗
ij | .,Tij = 1] and ˆ ¯ w∗
ij ≡ ln{exp[δ(ˆ z∗
ij + ˆ ¯ η∗
ij)] − 1} is
a consistent estimate for E[wij | .,Tij = 1] (see (13)). We therefore
can estimate (9) using the transformation
mij = β0 + λj + χi − γdij + ln
 
exp
 
δ
 
ˆ z∗
ij + ˆ ¯ η∗
ij
  
− 1
 
+ βuη ˆ ¯ η∗
ij + eij,
(14)
where βuη ≡ corr(uij,η ij)(σu/ση)a n deij is an i.i.d. error term sat-
isfying E[eij | .,Tij = 1] = 0. Because (14) is nonlinear in δ,w e
estimate it using nonlinear least squares.
The use of ˆ ¯ η∗
ij to control for E[uij | .,Tij = 1] is the standard
Heckman (1979) correction for sample selection. This addresses
the biases generated by the unobserved country-pair level shocks
uij and ηij. However, this does not correct for the biases generated
by the underlying unobserved ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. The lat-
ter biases are corrected by the additional control ˆ z∗
ij (along with
the functional form determined by our theoretical assumptions).
Used alone, the standard Heckman (1979) correction would only
be valid in a world without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, or where
such heterogeneity was not correlated with the export decision.
Thus, all ﬁrms are identically affected by trade barriers and coun-
try characteristics and make the same export decisions—or make
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country characteristics. This misses the potentially important ef-
fect of trade barriers and country characteristics on the share of
exporting ﬁrms. In a world with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, a larger
fraction of ﬁrms export to more “attractive” export destinations.19
Our empirical results highlight the overwhelming contribution of
this channel relative to the standard correction for sample selec-
tion, which ignores ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
To summarize, our theoretical framework delivers two equa-
tions, (11) and (14), which can be estimated in two stages.
Although the theoretical model allows for arbitrary varia-
tion in bilateral variable and ﬁxed trade costs, for estima-
tion purposes we restrict these variations to τ
ε−1
ij ≡ D
γ
ije−uij
and fij ≡ exp(φEX,j + φIM,i + κφij − νij), respectively. These re-
strictions make it possible to identifyγ and δ, which are important
parameters, but they do not make it possible to infer every param-
eter of the model. For example, we cannot separately identify the
elasticity of demand ε. Evidently, it is necessary to impose more
restrictions in order to gain additional identiﬁcation.20
Before describing the empirical results, we pause to note that
our distributional assumptions on the joint normality of the un-
observed trade costs and the Pareto distribution of ﬁrm-level pro-
ductivity affect the functional form of the trade ﬂow equation (14)
via the functional form of the two additional controls for ﬁrm het-
erogeneity ( ˆ ¯ w∗
ij) and sample selection (ˆ ¯ η∗
ij). After presenting our
main results, we will describe a number of alternative speciﬁ-
cations that relax these assumptions, yet generate very similar
estimates. They illustrate the robustness of the ﬁndings in our
baseline speciﬁcation.
V. TRADITIONAL ESTIMATES
Traditional estimates of the gravity equation use data on
country pairs that trade in at least one direction. The ﬁrst col-
umn in Table I provides a representative estimate of this sort for
all bilateral trade ﬂows reported in 1986 from a set of 158 coun-
tries (the full list is reported in Appendix I). Note that instead of
constructing symmetric trade ﬂows by combining exports and im-
ports for each country pair, we use the unidirectional trade value
19. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) ﬁnd that more French ﬁrms export
to larger foreign markets, and Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005) ﬁnd a similar
pattern for U.S. ﬁrms. Our model is consistent with these ﬁndings.
20. See, for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) for ways to estimate this elasticity.458 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I
BENCHMARK GRAVITY AND SELECTION INTO TRADING RELATIONSHIPS
1986 1980s
(Probit) (Probit) (Probit)
Variables mij Tij mij Tij mij Tij
Distance −1.176∗∗ −0.263∗∗ −1.201∗∗ −0.246∗∗ −1.200∗∗ −0.246∗∗
(0.031) (0.012) (0.024) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008)
Land border 0.458∗∗ −0.148∗∗ 0.366∗∗ −0.146∗∗ 0.364∗∗ −0.146∗∗
(0.147) (0.047) (0.131) (0.032) (0.131) (0.032)
Island −0.391∗∗ −0.136∗∗ −0.381∗∗ −0.140∗∗ −0.378∗∗ −0.140∗∗
(0.121) (0.032) (0.096) (0.022) (0.096) (0.022)
Landlock −0.561∗∗ −0.072 −0.582∗∗ −0.087∗∗ −0.581∗∗ −0.087∗∗
(0.188) (0.045) (0.148) (0.028) (0.147) (0.028)
Legal 0.486∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.050) (0.014) (0.040) (0.009) (0.040) (0.009)
Language 0.176∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.061) (0.016) (0.047) (0.011) (0.047) (0.011)
Colonial ties 1.299∗∗ 0.128 1.321∗∗ 0.114 1.326∗∗ 0.116
(0.120) (0.117) (0.110) (0.082) (0.110) (0.082)
Currency union 1.364∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 1.395∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 1.409∗∗ 0.206∗∗
(0.255) (0.052) (0.187) (0.026) (0.187) (0.026)
FTA 0.759∗∗ 0.494∗∗ 0.996∗∗ 0.497∗∗ 0.976∗∗ 0.495∗∗
(0.222) (0.020) (0.213) (0.018) (0.214) (0.018)
Religion 0.102 0.104∗∗ −0.018 0.099∗∗ −0.038 0.098∗∗
(0.096) (0.025) (0.076) (0.016) (0.077) (0.016)
WTO (none) −0.068 −0.056∗∗
(0.058) (0.013)
WTO (both) 0.303∗∗ 0.093∗∗
(0.042) (0.013)
Observations 11,146 24,649 110,697 248,060 110,697 248,060
R2 0.709 0.587 0.682 0.551 0.682 0.551
Notes.Exporter,importer,andyearﬁxedeffects.MarginaleffectsatsamplemeansandpseudoR2 reported
for Probit. Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair).
+ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
∗Signiﬁcant at 5%.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 1%.
and introduce both importing and exporting country ﬁxed effects.
With these ﬁxed effects every country pair is represented twice:
one time for exports from i to j and another time for exports from
j to i.21 Nevertheless, the results in Table I are similar to those
obtained with symmetric trade ﬂows and a unique country ﬁxed
effect. They show that country j exports more to country i when
the two countries are closer to each other, they both belong to the
21. Among the 158 × 157 = 24,806 possible bilateral trading relationships,
there are only 11,146 (less than half) positive trade ﬂows.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 459
same regional free trade agreement (FTA), they share a common
language, they have a common land border, they are not islands,
they share the same legal system, they share the same currency,
or one country has colonized the other. The probability that two
randomly drawn persons, one from each country, share the same
religion raises export volumes.22 Details on the construction of all
the variables are provided in Appendix I.
We next estimate a Probit equation for the presence of a
trading relationship using the same explanatory variables as the
initial gravity speciﬁcation (the speciﬁcation follows (12), with ex-
porter and importer ﬁxed effects). The marginal effects, evaluated
at the sample means, are reported in column (2).23 These results
clearly show that the very same variables that impact export vol-
umes from j to i also impact the probability that j exports to i.I n
almost all cases, the impact goes in the same direction. The effect
of a common border is the only exception: it raises the volume
of trade but reduces the probability of trading. We attribute this
ﬁnding to the effect of territorial border conﬂicts that suppress
trade between neighbors. In the absence of such conﬂicts, common
land borders enhance trade. We also note that a common religion
strongly affects the formation of trading relationships (its effect is
similar to that of a common language, increasing the probability
of trade by 10% for the “typical” country pair). Overall, this evi-
dence strongly suggests that disregarding the selection equation
of trading partners biases the estimates of the export equation, as
we have argued in Section IV.
These results and their consequences are not speciﬁc to 1986.
We repeat the same regressions increasing the sample years to
cover all of the 1980s, adding year ﬁxed effects. The results in
columns (3) and (4) are very similar to those in the ﬁrst two
columns. As expected, the standard errors are reduced (all stan-
dard errors are robust to clustering by country pairs). Adding
the time variation also allows the identiﬁcation of the effects of
changing country characteristics. We use this additional source
of variation to investigate the effects of WTO/GATT member-
ship (hereafter summarized as WTO) on trade volumes as well as
the formation of bilateral trade relationships. We thus repeat the
22. The common religion variable is not used in traditional gravity equations.
We have constructed it especially for use in our two-stage estimation procedure,
as explained in the following sections.
23. The sample size is reduced from 158 × 157 = 24,806 to 24,649 because
Congo did not export to anyone in 1986, and an exporter ﬁxed effect cannot be
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same regressions for the 1980s, adding bilateral controls when-
ever both countries or neither country is a member of WTO. As
emphasized by Subramanian and Wei (2007), the use of unidirec-
tional trade data and separate exporter and importer ﬁxed effects
substantially increases the statistically signiﬁcant positive effect
of WTO membership on trade volumes.24 Our theoretical frame-
work provides a justiﬁcation for this estimation strategy when
bilateral trade ﬂows are asymmetric. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd
that WTO membership has a very strong and signiﬁcant effect on
the formation of bilateral trading relationships. The coefﬁcients
in column (6) show that, for any country pair, joint WTO member-
ship has an impact on the probability of trade similar to common
language or colonial ties.25
In reporting results for the 1980s, we aim to show that our
choice of 1986 for the cross-section study does not affect the
estimates. In other words, there is nothing special about 1986.
And moreover, because this is mostly a methodological paper, we
do not think that the choice of year is particularly important. Yet
1986 has the added advantage that it allows us to compare our
results with French ﬁrm-level export data by destination reported
in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) (see below).
VI. TWO-STAGE ESTIMATION
We now turn to the second stage estimation of the trade
ﬂow equation (14). As we describe in Section IV, this requires
a ﬁrst-stage Probit selection equation (12) such as that reported
in Table I, which yields a predicted probability of export ˆ ρij (and
thus the additional ˆ ¯ w∗
ij and ˆ ¯ η∗
ij controls). Because we do not want
the identiﬁcation of our second stage estimates to rely on the
normality assumption for the unobserved trade costs, we also
need to select valid excluded variables for that second stage (we
will also relax these distributional assumptions through the use
of nonparametric methods). Our theoretical model suggests that
trade barriers that affect ﬁxed trade costs but do not affect vari-
able (per-unit) trade costs satisfy this exclusion restriction. We
now describe the construction of such variables.
24. Rose (2004) reports a signiﬁcant though smaller effect of WTO member-
ship on trade volumes using symmetric trade ﬂow data and a unique set of country
ﬁxed effects.
25. Whentwo countries bothjointhe WTO,theirprobability of trade increases
by 15%.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 461
We start with country-level data on the regulation costs of
ﬁrm entry, collected and analyzed by Djankov et al. (2002). These
entry costs are measured via their effects on the number of days,
the number of legal procedures, and the relative cost (as a per-
centage of GDP per capita) for an entrepreneur to legally start op-
erating a business.26 We surmise (and conﬁrm empirically) that
they also affect the costs faced by exporting ﬁrms to/from that
country, and that these costs are magniﬁed when both export-
ing and importing countries impose high regulatory hurdles. By
their nature, these measures affect ﬁrm-level ﬁxed rather than
variable costs of trade. We therefore construct an indicator for
high ﬁxed-cost trading country pairs, consisting of country pairs
in which both the importing and exporting countries have en-
try regulation measures above the cross-country median. One
variable uses the sum of the number of days and procedures
above the median (for both countries) whereas the other uses the
sum of the relative costs above the median (again for both coun-
tries).27 By construction, these bilateral variables reﬂect regula-
tion costs that should not depend on a ﬁrm’s volume of exports to
a particular country, and therefore satisfy the requisite exclusion
restrictions.28
Using these additional variables for our ﬁrst stage estima-
tion of selection into trading relationships entails a substantial
drop in sample size. First, 42 of 158 countries do not have any
available regulation cost data.29 Second, among the remaining
countries, 8 of them export to everyone, and Japan imports from
26. Unfortunately, historic data were not available. For this reason, we use
the data for 1999. See Djankov et al. (2002) for details.
27. Recall that these relative costs are measured as a percentage of GDP
per capita, so these cost measures can be compared across countries. We could
also have separated the number of days and procedures into separate variables,
but we found that the jointly deﬁned indicator variable has substantially more
explanatory power.
28. Variable (per-unit) export costs at the country level could potentially be
correlated with the ﬁxed regulation costs associated with trade. However, our ﬁrst
stage estimation also includes country ﬁxed effects. These correlated country-level
variable costs would then have to interact in the same pattern as the ﬁxed costs
across country pairs in order to generate a correlation at the country level that is
left uncontrolled by the country ﬁxed effects. This possibility is substantially more
remote than the potential correlation at the country level.
29. These 42 countries are Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Bermuda, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, French Guiana, Gabon, Gambia, Greenland, Guadeloupe, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Iceland, Iraq, Kiribati, North Korea, Liberia, Libya, Maldives, Malta,
Mauritius, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Qatar, Reunion, Seychelles, Somalia, St.
Kitts, Sudan, Suriname, Trinidad-Tobago, Turks Caicos, Western Sahara, and
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everyone.30 Fixed exporter (and in the case of Japan, importer) ef-
fects can thus not be estimated, and all the observations with that
particular exporter (or importer) are dropped. Third, the num-
ber of observations decreases with the square of the number of
dropped countries. Jointly, these factors account for the halving
of the available observations. This substantial decrease has led
us to statistically test the validity of the exclusion restriction for
additional bilateral trade barriers available for our full sample of
countries (see following section). For now, the most relevant issue
for our estimation purposes is that the additional cost variables
have substantial explanatory power for the formation of trading
relationships. This is strongly conﬁrmed by the results in the ﬁrst
column of Table II. We reran the same Probit equation (based on
(12)) as previously reported in Table I, adding our two cost mea-
sures. The results for all the explanatory variables from Table I
are roughly similar, and the two cost variables are economically
and statistically signiﬁcant.
We next estimate our fully parametrized trade ﬂow equa-
tion (14) using nonlinear least squares (NLS). We use the esti-
mates of the Probit equation for the reduced sample to construct
ˆ ¯ η∗
ij = φ(ˆ z∗
ij)/ (ˆ z∗
ij)a n d ˆ ¯ w∗
ij(δ) = ln{exp[δ(ˆ z∗
ij + ˆ ¯ η∗
ij)] − 1} for all coun-
try pairs with positive trade ﬂows.31 The former controls for the
sample selection bias whereas the latter controls for unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity, that is, the effect of trade frictions and coun-
try characteristics on the proportion of exporters. We ﬁrst report
the results from a benchmark gravity equation without these con-
trols in the second column of Table II and then report our NLS
results in the third column. The standard errors are bootstrapped
basedonsampling(500times)allavailablecountrieswithreplace-
ment and using all the potential country pairs from that country
sample. Both the nonlinear coefﬁcient δ for ˆ ¯ w∗
ij and the linear
30. These 8 countries are Japan, Hong Kong, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.
31. Recallthat ˆ z∗
ij =  −1(ˆ ρij).Thecharacteristicsofourdatainducesacompli-
cation associated with this transformation: Our sample includes a relatively small
number of country pairs whose characteristics are such that their probability of
trade ˆ ρij is indistinguishable from 1. We therefore cannot infer any differences in
the ˆ z∗
ij’s among this subgroup of country pairs based on their probability of trade
(whose binary realization is the only relevant datum we observe). Hence, we assign
the same ˆ z∗
ij to those country pairs with an estimated ˆ ρij >. 9999999, equivalent
to an estimated ˆ ρij at this cutoff. This censoring affects 4.3% of the 6,602 country
pairs with positive trade ﬂows from the Probit estimation on the reduced sample
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TABLE II
BASELINE RESULTS
1986 reduced sample
mij
Indicator variables
(Probit)
Variables Tij Benchmark NLS Polynomial 50 bins 100 bins
Distance −0.213∗∗ −1.167∗∗ −0.813∗∗ −0.847∗∗ −0.755∗∗ −0.789∗∗
(0.016) (0.040) (0.049) (0.052) (0.070) (0.088)
Land border −0.087 0.627∗∗ 0.871∗∗ 0.845∗∗ 0.892∗∗ 0.863∗∗
(0.072) (0.165) (0.170) (0.166) (0.170) (0.170)
Island −0.173∗ −0.553∗ −0.203 −0.218 −0.161 −0.197
(0.078) (0.269) (0.290) (0.258) (0.259) (0.258)
Landlock −0.053 −0.432∗ −0.347∗ −0.362+− 0.352+− 0.353+
(0.050) (0.189) (0.175) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
Legal 0.049∗∗ 0.535∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.434∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.418∗∗
(0.019) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
Language 0.101∗∗ 0.147+− 0.030 −0.017 −0.061 −0.036
(0.021) (0.075) (0.087) (0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Colonial ties −0.009 0.909∗∗ 0.847∗∗ 0.848∗∗ 0.853∗∗ 0.838∗∗
(0.130) (0.158) (0.257) (0.148) (0.152) (0.153)
Currency union 0.216∗∗ 1.534∗∗ 1.077∗∗ 1.150∗∗ 1.045∗∗ 1.107∗∗
(0.038) (0.334) (0.360) (0.333) (0.337) (0.346)
FTA 0.343∗∗ 0.976∗∗ 0.124 0.241 −0.141 0.065
(0.009) (0.247) (0.227) (0.197) (0.250) (0.348)
Religion 0.141∗∗ 0.281∗ 0.120 0.139 0.073 0.100
(0.034) (0.120) (0.136) (0.120) (0.124) (0.128)
Regulation −0.108∗∗ −0.146
costs (0.036) (0.100)
R. costs (days −0.061∗ −0.216+
&p r o c . ) ( 0 .031) (0.124)
δ (from ˆ ¯ w∗
ij)0 .840∗∗
(0.043)
ˆ ¯ η∗
ij 0.240∗ 0.882∗∗
(0.099) (0.209)
ˆ ¯ z∗
ij 3.261∗∗
(0.540)
ˆ ¯ z∗2
ij −0.712∗∗
(0.170)
ˆ ¯ z∗3
ij 0.060∗∗
(0.017)
Observations 12,198 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602
R2 0.573 0.693 0.701 0.704 0.706
Notes. Exporter and importer ﬁxed effects. Marginal effects at sample means and pseudo R2 reported
for Probit. Regulation costs are excluded variables in all second stage speciﬁcations. Bootstrapped standard
errors for NLS; robust standard errors (clustering by country pair) elsewhere.
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
∗Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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coefﬁcient for ˆ ¯ η∗
ij are precisely estimated. The remaining results
forthelinearcoefﬁcientsclearlydemonstratetheimportanceofan
unmeasured heterogeneity bias in the estimated effects of trade
barriers: higher trade volumes are not just the direct consequence
of lower trade barriers; they also represent a greater proportion of
exporters to a particular destination. Consequently, the measures
of the effects of trade frictions in the benchmark gravity equa-
tion are biased upward, as they confound the true effect of these
frictions with their indirect effect on the proportion of exporting
ﬁrms.32 As highlighted in Table II, these biases are substantial.
The coefﬁcient on distance drops roughly by a third, indicating a
much smaller effect of distance on ﬁrm-level (hence product-level)
trade.33 The effects of a currency union and colonial ties on ﬁrm
or product level trade are also substantially reduced. The bias
for the effect of FTAs is even more severe, as its coefﬁcient drops
by almost an order of magnitude and becomes insigniﬁcant. The
measured effect of a common language is also strongly affected; it
becomes insigniﬁcant (the benchmark coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at
the 5.2% level) and is precisely estimated around zero. Similarly
for common religion: it becomes insigniﬁcant. This suggests that
FTAs, a common language, and a common religion predominantly
reduce the ﬁxed costs of trade: they have a great inﬂuence on a
ﬁrm’s choice of export location, but not on its export volume once
the exporting decision has been made.
We now progressively relax the parameterization assump-
tions that determined our functional forms. First, we relax the
assumption governing the distribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity, and
hence the form of the control function ˆ ¯ w∗
ij(δ)f o rˆ ¯ z∗
ij in the trade
ﬂow equation (14). That is, we drop the Pareto assumption for
G(.) and revert to the general speciﬁcation for Vij in (5). Using
(4) and (10), vij ≡ υ(zij) is now an arbitrary (increasing) function
of zij. We then directly control for E[Vij | .,Tij = 1] using υ(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij),
which we approximate with a polynomial in ˆ ¯ z∗
ij. This replaces
ˆ ¯ w∗
ij ≡ ln{exp[δ(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij)] − 1} in (14).34 As the nonlinearity induced by
ˆ ¯ w∗
ij is eliminated, we now estimate the second stage using OLS.
32. The effect of a land border is an exception because it negatively affects
the probability of trade.
33. Several studies have documented that the effect of distance in gravity
models is overstated because distance is correlated with other trade frictions (such
as lack of information). The same issue applies here and would even further reduce
the directly measured effect of distance.
34. Recall that wij and vij differ only by a constant term.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 465
In practice, we have found no noticeable changes from expand-
ing υ(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij) beyond a cubic polynomial. The results from this sec-
ond stage estimation (the ﬁrst stage Probit remains unchanged)
are reported in the fourth column of Table II. These results are
very similar to the NLS estimates.35 In other words, the Pareto
distribution does not appear to unduly constrain our baseline
speciﬁcation.
We further relax the joint normality assumption for the un-
observed trade costs, and hence the Mills ratio functional form
for the selection correction. This naturally precludes the separa-
tion of the effects of the latter from the ﬁrm heterogeneity effects.
However, we can still jointly control for these effects with a ﬂexi-
ble nonparametric functional form and thus obtain our key results
for the intensive-margin contribution of the various trade barri-
ers. The ﬁrst stage estimation remains the same except that we
now can use any cumulative distribution function instead of the
normal distribution. We have experimented with the Logit and
t-distributions with various low degrees of freedom and found
that the resulting predicted probabilities ˆ ρij are strikingly simi-
lar. For this reason, we no longer use the normality assumption to
recoverthe ˆ ¯ z∗
ij and ˆ ¯ η∗
ij.Instead,weworkdirectlywiththepredicted
probabilities ˆ ρij.
In order to approximate as ﬂexibly as possible an arbitrary
functionalformofthe ˆ ρijs,weusealargesetofindicatorvariables.
We partition the obtained ˆ ρijs into a number of bins with equal
observations and assign an indicator variable to every bin. We
then replace the ˆ ¯ w∗
ij and ˆ ¯ η∗
ij controls from the NLS estimation or
the ˆ ¯ z∗
ij and ˆ ¯ η∗
ij controls from the polynomial estimation with this
set of indicator variables. We report results with both 50 and 100
bins, to ensure a large degree of ﬂexibility.36 The results are in
the last two columns of Table II. Here, we use the predicted prob-
abilities from the baseline Probit, but these results are virtually
unchangedwhenswitchingtoaLogitorat-distributionintheﬁrst
stage. Evidently, all three estimation methods yield very similar
results.
35. Here, we report the robust standard errors controlling for clustering at
the country-pair level but do not correct for the generated regressors in the second
stage. We experimented with bootstrapping the standard errors, as performed
for the NLS speciﬁcation, but this barely affected any of them. No coefﬁcient
signiﬁcance test (at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level) was affected.
36. As with the polynomial approximation, this speciﬁcation is now linear,
and we thus use OLS.466 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE EXCLUDED VARIABLE
Although the use of regulation cost variables has advantages,
it also has a drawback: it substantially reduces the number of
usable observations, as we explained in Section V (from 24,649 to
12,198 for the ﬁrst stage, and from 11,156 to 6,602 for the second
stage). For this reason it is desirable to ﬁnd at least one other
variable that satisﬁes the exclusion restrictions, which can be
used for estimation with the full sample of countries. We argue in
thissectionthatourreligionvariableissuitableforthispurpose.37
Once we have reliable excluded variables, such as our regu-
lation cost variables, we can test whether any additional variable
satisﬁes the exclusion restrictions. The key is for this variable to
be correlated with the zij’s but not be correlated with the resid-
ual of the second stage equation that has been estimated with the
reliable excluded variables (the reliable excluded variables are be-
lieved to satisfy the exclusion restrictions on theoretical grounds).
In our case this means that the residuals from the trade ﬂow equa-
tion should be uncorrelated with this variable. We argue that our
common religion variable satisﬁes these requirements.
That the religion variable satisﬁes the ﬁrst requirement is
evident from the Probit equation, in which religion has a positive
and signiﬁcant effect on the probability of exporting (see Tables I
and II). A simple test of the second requirement is provided in
Table II. As is evident from the standard errors, one cannot reject
the hypothesis that the coefﬁcient on religion equals zero in each
and every case. In other words, religion is not correlated with
the second stage residuals.38 To further enhance conﬁdence in
common religion as the excluded variable, we rerun all the second
stage speciﬁcations from Table II, dropping the regulation cost
variables and using religion as the excluded variable. The results
of this estimation procedure applied to the reduced sample are
reported in the left-hand-side panel of Table III. Evidently, they
are very similar to the results in Table II.
37. We also experimented using the common language variable as the ex-
cluded variable. We obtained results almost identical to those using religion as the
excluded variable.
38. We also performed a chi-squared test with one overidentiﬁcation restric-
tion (see Wooldridge [2002]) using all three excluded variables (the two regulations
of entry costs variables and common religion). However, since the second stage
residuals are no longer normally distributed after correcting for sample selection,
this test is only asymptotically valid. Still, in all speciﬁcations, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that all three variables are uncorrelated with the second stage
residuals.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 467
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Once religion is accepted as a legitimate excluded variable,
we can use it to estimate the model on the full sample of countries
instead of the smaller sample that has been used so far, thereby
roughly doubling the number of usable observations. The results
of this estimation are reported in the right-hand-side panel of Ta-
ble III for all three estimation methods (the benchmark gravity
and Probit selection results were already reported in Table I). The
magnitudes of these coefﬁcients remain comparable despite the
substantial increase in sample size.39 Similar to the reduced sam-
ple estimates, we ﬁnd that heterogeneity matters; higher trade
volumes are driven both by direct effects of lower trade barriers
and by greater proportions of exporters. As a result, estimated
trade frictions in the benchmark gravity equation are biased up-
ward, confounding the true effects with the indirect effects on the
fraction of exporting ﬁrms.40 As is evident from Table III, these bi-
ases are substantial; the coefﬁcients on distance, currency union,
colonial ties, language, and FTAs drop signiﬁcantly.41
The substantial increase in country coverage allows us to
study how these biases vary with the characteristics of the
country pairs, which we explore in our counterfactual analysis
in the following section. For now, we also take advantage of
the inclusion of French exports in the full sample to compare
our estimates for the extensive margin of French exports to the
direct measure of the number of French exporting ﬁrms across
destinations reported by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) for
1986. In our model, wij is an increasing function of the fraction
of ﬁrms exporting from country j to country i. Our estimates of
wij for j = France should therefore be positively correlated with
the number of French exporters to country i reported by Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2004). We check this using our estimates
for both ˆ ¯ w∗
ij from the NLS speciﬁcation and for ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij) from the
polynomial approximation. These correlations are extremely high
in both cases: 77% for ˆ ¯ w∗
ij and 78% for ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij).42
39. The effects of FTAs are estimated to be signiﬁcantly higher in the NLS
and polynomial approximation speciﬁcations, though still substantially lower than
in the benchmark estimates.
40. The effect of a land border is again an exception, because it negatively
affects the probability of trade.
41. In the working paper version (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 2007),
we also report results for the 1980s. They show that 1986 is not exceptional in
terms of the full sample estimates. The coefﬁcient for joint membership in the
WTO drops substantially, but remains statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
42. Because wij is a logged value, we compute the correlation using the loga-
rithm of the number of exporting ﬁrms.470 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
VIII. ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS
We now use the full sample estimates from the previous sec-
tion to examine several aspects of the results in further detail.
VIII.A. Decomposing the Biases
Our second stage estimate addresses two different sources
of bias for standard gravity equations: a selection bias that arises
fromthepairingofcountriesintoexporter–importerrelationships,
and an unobserved heterogeneity bias that results from the varia-
tion in the fraction of ﬁrms that export from a source to a destina-
tion country. To examine the relative importance of these biases,
we now estimate two speciﬁcations of the second-stage equation,
one controlling for unobserved heterogeneity only, the other con-
trolling for selection only.
The results are reported in Table IV. The ﬁrst two columns
report the benchmark equation and our second stage NLS esti-
mates from the full sample from Tables I and III. The differences
in the estimated coefﬁcients of these two equations represent the
joint outcome of the two biases. As we discussed, all the coefﬁ-
cients, with the exception of the land border effect, are lower in
absolute value in the second column. We then implement a sim-
ple linear correction for unobserved heterogeneity by only adding
ˆ z∗
ij =  −1(ˆ ρij) as an additional regressor to the standard gravity
speciﬁcation (here, we do not correct for the sample selection bias
via ˆ ¯ η∗
ij).43 The results reported in the third column clearly show
that this unobserved heterogeneity (the proportion of exporting
ﬁrms) addresses almost all the biases in the standard gravity
equation. The coefﬁcients and standard errors for all the observed
trade barriers are very similar to those obtained in our second
stage nonlinear estimation.
Inthefourthcolumn,wecorrectonlyfortheselectionbias(the
standard two-stage Heckman (1979) selection procedure) by intro-
ducing the Mills ratio ˆ ¯ η∗
ij as an additional regressor to the bench-
markspeciﬁcation.Althoughtheestimatedcoefﬁcienton ˆ ¯ η∗
ijispos-
itive and signiﬁcant, the remaining coefﬁcients are very similar
to those obtained in the benchmark speciﬁcation of column (1).44
43. In this exercise we want to ensure a simple monotonic transformation of
ˆ z∗
ij,s ow ed on o ta d da n yh i g h e ro r d e rt e r m s .
44. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Silva and Tenreyro (2006), whose
application of a Poisson estimation method on a sample that consists of positive
trade ﬂows and a sample that includes zeros as well yields similar results.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 471
TABLE IV
BIAS DECOMPOSITION
1986 full sample
Firm Heckman
Variables Benchmark NLS heterogeneity selection
Distance −1.176∗∗ −0.798∗∗ −0.769∗∗ −1.214∗∗
(0.031) (0.039) (0.038) (0.031)
Land border 0.458∗∗ 0.834∗∗ 0.855∗∗ 0.436∗∗
(0.147) (0.132) (0.142) (0.149)
Island −0.391∗∗ −0.169 −0.164 −0.425∗∗
(0.121) (0.120) (0.118) (0.120)
Landlock −0.561∗∗ −0.447∗∗ −0.433∗ −0.565∗∗
(0.188) (0.172) (0.187) (0.187)
Legal 0.486∗∗ 0.387∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.488∗∗
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
Language 0.176∗∗ 0.023 0.023 0.223∗∗
(0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061)
Colonial ties 1.299∗∗ 1.001∗∗ 0.979∗∗ 1.311∗∗
(0.120) (0.204) (0.119) (0.123)
Currency union 1.364∗∗ 1.023∗∗ 0.996∗∗ 1.391∗∗
(0.255) (0.273) (0.260) (0.257)
FTA 0.759∗∗ 0.380∗ 0.314+ 0.737∗∗
(0.222) (0.182) (0.168) (0.235)
Religion 0.102
(0.096)
δ (from ˆ ¯ w∗
ij)0 .871∗∗
(0.028)
ˆ ¯ η∗
ij 0.372∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(0.069) (0.070)
ˆ ¯ z∗
ij 0.892∗∗
(0.051)
Observations 11,146 11,146 11,146 11,146
R2 0.709 0.716 0.710
Notes. mij is dependent variable throughout. Exporter and importer ﬁxed effects. Religion is excluded
variable in all second stage speciﬁcations. Bootstrapped standard errors for NLS; robust standard errors
(clustering by country pair) elsewhere.
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
∗Signiﬁcant at 5%.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Thus, the bias corrections implemented in our second stage
estimation are dominated by the inﬂuence of unobserved ﬁrm
heterogeneity rather than sample selection. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that although aggregate country-pair shocks do have a
signiﬁcant effect on trade patterns, they only negligibly affect the472 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE V
ASYMMETRIES
1986 full sample
mij − mji
Variable Tij − Tji NLS Polynomial
ˆ ρij − ˆ ρji 0.999∗∗
(0.0169)
ˆ ¯ w∗
ij − ˆ ¯ w∗
ji 1.187∗∗ 1.251∗∗
(0.042) (0.266)
ˆ v(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij) − ˆ v(ˆ ¯ z∗
ji)1 .012∗∗ 0.703∗∗
(0.035) (0.143)
Country ﬁxed effects No No Yes No Yes
Observations 12,246 4,517 4,517 4,517 4,517
R2 0.219 0.153 0.324 0.157 0.325
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 1%.
responsiveness of trade volumes to observed trade barriers.45
The results in column (3) clearly show that this is not the case
for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity: the latter would
affect trade volumes even were all country pairs trading with one
another, because it operates independently of the selection effect.
Neglecting to control for this unobserved heterogeneity induces
most of the biases exhibited in the standard gravity speciﬁcation.
VIII.B. Evidence on Asymmetric Trade Relationships
As was previously mentioned, our model predicts asymmetric
tradeﬂowsbetweencountries.Theseasymmetriescanbeextreme,
with trade predicted in only one direction, as also reﬂected in the
data. More nuanced, trade can be positive in both directions, but
with a net trade imbalance. Do these predicted asymmetries have
explanatory powerforthedirectionoftradeﬂowsandnetbilateral
trade balances? The answer is an overwhelming yes, as evidenced
by the results reported in Table V. The ﬁrst part of the table shows
the results of the OLS regression of Tij − Tji on ˆ ρij − ˆ ρji (based on
the Probit results for 1986).46 Note that the regressand, Tij − Tji,
takes on the values −1, 0, and 1, depending on the direction of
45. This ﬁnding also highlights the important information conveyed by the
nontrading country pairs. If such zero trade values were just the outcome of cen-
soring, then a Tobit speciﬁcation would provide the best ﬁt to the data. This is just
a more restrictive version of the selection model, which is rejected by the data in
favor of the speciﬁcation incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity.
46. Recall that Tij is the indicator variable for positive trade from j to i.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 473
trade between i and j (it is 0 if trade ﬂows in both directions or
if the countries do not trade at all). The magnitude of the regres-
sor ˆ ρij − ˆ ρji measures the model’s prediction for an asymmetric
trading relationship, while its sign predicts the direction of the
asymmetry. Table V shows that the predicted asymmetries have
a substantial amount of explanatory power; the regressor coefﬁ-
cient is signiﬁcant at any conventional level and explains on its
own 22% of the variation in the direction of trade.47 We emphasize
that the regressor is constructed only from the predicted probabil-
ity of export ˆ ρij, which is a function only of country-level variables
(the ﬁxed effects) and symmetric bilateral measures.
The second part of Table V focuses on bilateral trade ﬂow
asymmetries between country pairs trading in both directions.
It shows the results of the OLS regression of net bilateral trade
mij − mji (the percentage difference between exports and imports)
on alternatively ˆ ¯ w∗
ij − ˆ ¯ w∗
ji (for the NLS speciﬁcation) or ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗
ij) −
ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗
ji) (for the polynomial approximation). That regressor captures
differences in the proportion of exporting ﬁrms. Combined with
the country ﬁxed effects, these variables capture differences in the
number of exporting ﬁrms from one country to the other. Again,
we ﬁnd that this single regressor (using either speciﬁcation) is
a strong predictor of net bilateral trade. On its own, it explains
15%–16% of the variance in net trade, and along with the country
ﬁxed effects it explains 32%–33% of that variance.48
VIII.C. Counterfactuals
We have just shown how the ﬁtted values for ρij and w∗
ij can
explain a large portion of the variation in the direction of trade
and in its extensive margin. We next show how to use these ﬁtted
values to make predictions about the response of trade to changes
in trade costs. For every change in the bilateral trade costs dij,o u r
model predicts the new pattern of trade, that is, who trades with
whom, and in which direction. In addition, for country pairs that
trade with each other, the model predicts the resulting changes in
thecompositionoftradeﬂowsbetweentheextensiveandintensive
margins. These counterfactual predictions can be measured, and
47. This understates the variable’s explanatory power, because it is continu-
ous and it predicts a discrete variable.
48. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) account for asymmetric bilateral trade
ﬂows with asymmetric variable bilateral trade costs. In a more general model one
can have both asymmetric bilateral trade costs and asymmetric extensive margins
of trade.474 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
we illustrate their quantitative impact for a reduction in trade
costs associated with distance.
In response to a drop in distance-related trade costs, some
countries start trading with one another. Trade rises for country
pairs that traded before the drop in trade costs, and we report how
the increase in trade can be decomposed into the intensive and ex-
tensive margin. We ﬁnd that the extensive margin is especially
important in shaping the response of trade ﬂows across coun-
try pairs because it generates substantial heterogeneity across
country pairs. This richness contrasts sharply with the uniform
response implied by the baseline gravity model, which does not
account for the extensive margin of trade (nor does it account for
the creation of new trading relationships).
The computation of these responses involves some techni-
cal details that are explained in Appendix III. Here we report
the results of a particular counterfactual experiment involving
a decrease in the trade costs associated with distance. That is,
we investigate the response of trade for any given country pair,
assuming that the distance between these two country pairs de-
creases by a given percentage. We ﬁrst focus on country pairs
observed trading and focus on the elasticity of the overall trade
response for each country pair: | ˆ m 
ij − mij|/|d 
ij − dij|, where dij now
speciﬁcally references the bilateral distance variable.49 Since our
model predicts different response elasticities with the magnitude
of the trade decrease, we report these elasticities for the case of a
10% distance decrease (d 
ij − dij = log0.9), although any percent-
age decrease under 20% would yield virtually identical results.50
As was previously mentioned, the elasticities vary widely
acrossdifferentcountrypairs.Inordertohighlighthowtheseelas-
ticitiesvaryalongoneimportantcountrypairdimension—country
income—we report summary statistics across three groups of
country pairs: North–North, North–South, and South–South,
sorted by GDP per capita.51 These statistics appear in Table IV for
49. To avoid any confusion when discussing “larger” versus “smaller” elastic-
ities, we express the elasticities in absolute value. Naturally, for the case of trade
costs, these elasticities are all negative.
50. Larger decreases in trade costs would produce larger elasticities but with
similar qualitative patterns across country pairs.
51. We use 1986 U.S. $15,000 as the cutoff GDP per capita between North and
South. The former group is composed of nineteen countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium-Luxemburg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and the United States.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 475
TABLE VI
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE TRADE ELASTICITY RESPONSE ACROSS COUNTRY PAIRS
Country Number of Nonlinear least squares Polynomial aproximation
pairs country
group pairs Mean S. D. Min Max Mean S. D. Min Max
NN 342 1.292 0.034 1.283 1.642 1.290 0.107 1.141 2.222
NS 4,626 1.404 0.152 1.283 2.949 1.526 0.386 1.141 2.895
SS 6,178 1.698 0.303 1.283 3.777 2.130 0.443 1.141 2.995
Overall 11,146 1.563 0.289 1.283 3.777 1.854 0.517 1.141 2.995
both our NLS and polynomial approximation speciﬁcations. Im-
portantly,weemphasizethatalltheheterogeneityintheelasticity
response is driven by the extensive margin because the elastic-
ity response at the intensive margin is ﬁxed at 0.799 (NLS) and
0.862 (polynomial approximation). Because this extensive mar-
gin response depends fundamentally on the functional forms for
ˆ ¯ w∗ 
ij or ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij) in terms of ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij, we report the elasticities for both
cases. Although the shape of the functional form for ˆ ¯ w∗ 
ij is in part
determined by our theoretical modeling assumptions (see (13)),
the shape of the ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij) is entirely data-driven. Reassuringly, both
functions have very similar shapes over the range of ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij,a n dt h e
counterfactual distributions of the response elasticity are similar.
The heterogeneous trade responses reported in Table IV show
that these elasticities vary between 1.283 and 3.777 for the NLS
estimates and between 1.141 and 2.995 for the semiparametric
estimates, large variations indeed.52 We visually depict these dis-
tributions across country pairs group in Figure III. The charts
clearly document how the range and distribution of elasticities
vary with country income: the elasticities are highest for South–
South trade, lower for North–South trade, and lowest for North–
North trade. Thus, when trade costs related to distance fall, our
estimates predict that the response of the extensive margin of
trade is larger for less developed countries.53
52. Of course, departing from the log-linear speciﬁcation for distance would
yield different elasticities for different changes in trade costs related to distance.
Our main point is that, given a log-linear speciﬁcation for distance in both stages,
our model still predicts substantial differences in the response elasticity, driven
by the characteristics of the country pairs that jointly determine the extensive
margin of trade.
53. In Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) we also report how many of
the countries that do not trade initially and which pairs start trading when the
trade costs fall. These results suggest that large changes in trade-related costs
are needed to induce nontrading country pairs, involving at least one Southern476 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE III
The Distribution of the Distance Elasticity across Country Pairs
IX. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Empirical explanations of international trade ﬂows have a
long tradition. The gravity equation with various measures of
trade resistance plays a key role in this literature. Indeed, esti-
mates of the impact of trade resistance measures provide impor-
tant information about the roles played by common currencies,
free trade areas, membership in the WTO, and other features of
trading countries. For this reason, it is important to obtain reli-
able estimates of the effects of those trade barriers/enhancers on
international trade ﬂows.
We develop in this paper an estimation procedure that cor-
rects certain biases embodied in the standard gravity estimation
of trade ﬂows. Our approach is driven by theoretical as well as
econometric considerations. On the theoretical side, we develop
a simple model that is capable of explaining empirical phenom-
ena, such as zero trade ﬂows between certain pairs of countries
and larger numbers of exporters to larger destination markets.
We then derive from this theory a two-equation system that can
be estimated with standard data sets. Importantly, this system
country, to trade. Moreover, they are in line with the evidence presented in Figures
I and II that almost all of the increase in world trade ﬂows in the last thirty years
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enables one to decompose the impact on trade volumes of all trade
resistance measures into their intensive (trade volume per ﬁrm)
and extensive (number of exporting ﬁrms) margin components.
We show how to obtain estimates of this decomposition without
having ﬁrm-level data, but rather country-level data that are nor-
mally used to estimate trade ﬂows. The ability to obtain such
a decomposition is important because, in practice, a substantial
proportion of trade adjustment takes place at the extensive mar-
gin, and it is not possible to obtain consistent ﬁrm-level data
with export destinations for a large number of countries (which
would be needed for a direct estimation of the extensive margin
component).
Our empirical analysis has been conﬁned to country-level
trade ﬂows, where about half of the observations are zeros. Nat-
urally, the problem of zeros is even more severe at the industry
level. That is, in data sets of sectoral trade ﬂows the fraction
of zeros is much larger. Importantly, our estimation method can
be implemented on such data sets as well. Manova (2006) is an
example of this, highlighting the important contribution of the
extensive margin of trade in explaining the impact of ﬁnancial
frictions on sectoral trade ﬂows.
A variety of robustness checks show that the resulting es-
timates are not sensitive to the estimation method (parametric,
semiparametric, or nonparametric) nor to the excluded variables
from the ﬁrst stage of our two-stage estimation procedure. More-
over, these estimates suggest that the biases embodied in the com-
monly used approach are substantial and that they are mostly due
to the omitted control for the extensive margin of trade. Especially
important is our ﬁnding that the bias not only is large, but also
substantially varies across country pairs with different charac-
teristics. In particular, the response of the trade ﬂow between one
pair of countries to a given reduction in distance-related trade
frictions (such as transport costs) can be as much as three times
larger than the response of the trade ﬂow between another pair
of countries. We show how these large variations across country
pairs in the response to a given trade friction reduction are driven
by variation in the extensive margin responses.
Finally, we note that our estimation procedure is easy to im-
plement. In addition, it is ﬂexible, because it allows the use of
parametric, semiparametric, and nonparametric speciﬁcations. In
other words, the procedure provides the researcher with ﬂexibility
and convenience in individual applications.478 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
APPENDIX I
We describe in this Appendix our data sources.
Trade data: The bilateral trade ﬂows are from Feenstra’s
“World Trade Flows, 1970–1992” and “World Trade Flows, 1980–
1997.” These data include 183 “country titles” over the period
1970 to 1997. In some cases Feenstra grouped several countries
into a single title. We excluded twelve such country titles and
three proper countries for which data other than trade ﬂows were
missing. This left usable data for bilateral trade ﬂows among 158
countries. The list of these countries is provided in Table A.1.
For the 158 countries we constructed a matrix of trade ﬂows,
measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, using the U.S. CPI. This
matrix represents 158 × 157 = 24,806 observations, consisting of
exports from country j to country i. Many of these export ﬂows
are zeros.
Country-level data: Population and real GDP per capita have
been obtained from two standard sources: the Penn World Tables
6.1 and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
We used the CIA’s World Factbook to construct a number of
variables, which can be classiﬁed as follows:54
1. Geography: Latitude, longitude, and whether a country is
landlocked or an island.
2. Institutions: Legal origin, colonial origin, GATT/WTO
membership.
3. Culture: Primary language and religion.
We also used data from Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002),
as presented on Andrew Rose’s Web site, to identify whether a
country pair belongs to the same currency union or the same FTA.
And we used data from Rose (2004) to identify whether a country
is a member of the GATT/WTO.
Using these data, we constructed country-pair speciﬁc vari-
ables, such as the distance between countries i and j,w h e t h e r
they share a border, the same legal system, the same colonial
origin, or membership in the GATT/WTO (see below).
The construction of the regulation costs of ﬁrm entry are de-
scribed inthemaintext.Aspreviously mentioned, costdataonthe
number of days, number of legal procedures, and relative cost (as
percent of GDP per capita) are reported in Djankov et al. (2002).
54. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/proﬁleguide.html.ESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 479
TABLE A.1
LIST OF COUNTRIES
Afghanistan Ecuador Korea DPR Romania
Albania Egypt Korea Rep. Rwanda
Algeria El Salvador Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Angola Eq. Guinea Laos Senegal
Argentina Ethiopia Lebanon Seychelles
Australia Fiji Liberia Sierra Leone
Austria Finland Libya Singapore
Bahamas Fm. Czechoslovakia Madagascar Solomon Islds.
Bahrain Fm. USSR Malawi Somalia
Bangladesh Fm. Yugoslavia Malaysia South Africa
Barbados France Maldives Spain
Belgium–Lux. French Guiana Mali Sri Lanka
Belize Gabon Malta St Kitts Nevis
Benin Gambia Mauritania Sudan
Bermuda Germany Mauritius Surinam
Bhutan Ghana Mexico Sweden
Bolivia Greece Mongolia Switzerland
Brazil Greenland Morocco Syria
Brunei Guadeloupe Mozambique Taiwan
Bulgaria Guatemala Myanmar Thailand
Burkina Faso Guinea Nepal Togo
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Trinidad-Tobago
Cambodia Guyana Neth. Antilles Tunisia
Cameroon Haiti New Caledonia Turkey
Canada Honduras New Zealand Turks and Caicos
Cayman Islds Hong Kong Nicaragua Uganda
Central Africa Hungary Niger United Kingdom
Chad Iceland Nigeria United Arab Em.
Chile India Norway United Rep.
China Indonesia Oman Tanzania
Colombia Iran Pakistan United States
Comoros Islds. Iraq Panama Uruguay
Congo Ireland Papua N.Guinea Venezuela
Costa Rica Israel Paraguay Vietnam
Cote D’Ivoire Italy Peru Western Sahara
Cuba Jamaica Philippines Yemen
Cyprus Japan Poland Zaire
Denmark Jordan Portugal Zambia
Djibouti Kenya Qatar Zimbabwe
Dominican Rep. Kiribati Reunion
Main Variables:
1. Distance: the distance (in km) between importer’s i and
exporter’s j capitals (in logs).480 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2. Common border: a binary variable that equals one if im-
porter i and exporter j are neighbors that meet a common
physical boundary, and zero otherwise.
3. Island: a binary variable that equals one if both importer
i and exporter j are islands, and zero otherwise.
4. Landlocked: a binary variable that equals one if both ex-
portingcountry j andimportingcountryi havenocoastline
or direct access to sea, and zero otherwise.
5. Colonialties:abinaryvariablethatequalsoneifimporting
country i ever colonized exporting country j or vice versa,
and zero otherwise.
6. Currency union: a binary variable that equals one if im-
porting country i and exporting country j use the same
currency or if within the country pair money was inter-
changeable at a 1:1 exchange rate for an extended period
of time (see Rose [2000, 2004] and Glick and Rose [2002]),
and zero otherwise.
7. Legal system: a binary variable that equals one if the im-
porting country i and exporting country j share the same
legal origin, and zero otherwise.
8. Religion: (% Protestants in country i · % Protestants in
country j)+(%Catholicsincountryi ·%Catholicsincoun-
try j) + (% Muslims in country i · % Muslims in country j).
9. FTA: a binary variable that equals one if exporting
country j and importing country i belong to a common
regional trade agreement, and zero otherwise.
10. WTO: a vector of two dummy variables: the ﬁrst binary
variable equals one if both exporting country j and import-
ing country id on o tbelong to the GATT/WTO, and zero
otherwise; the second binary variable equals one if both
countries belong to the GATT/WTO, and zero otherwise.
11. Entry costs: a binary indicator that equals one if the sum
of the number of days and procedures to form a business
is above the median for both the importing country i and
exporting country j, or if the relative cost (as percent of
GDP per capita) of forming a business is above the median
in the exporting country j and the importing country i,
and zero otherwise.
APPENDIX II
We derive in this Appendix a gravity equation with third-
country effects, which generalizes Anderson and van Wincoop’sESTIMATING TRADE FLOWS 481
(2003) equation, and we show that their equation applies when-
ever τij = τji for every country pair and Vij can be decomposed
in a particular way. We then discuss some limitations of their
formulation.
Equality of income and expenditure implies Yi =
 J
j=1 Mji.
That is, the value of country i’s exports to all countries, including
sales to home residents Mii, equals the value of country i’s output.
Equation (6) then implies
(15) Yj =
 cj
α
 1−ε
Nj
 
h
 
τhj
Ph
 1−ε
YhVhj.
Using this expression we can rewrite the bilateral trade volume
(6) as
(16) Mij =
YiYj
Y
 
τij
Pi
 1−ε
Vij
 J
h=1
 
τhj
Ph
 1−ε
Vhjsh
,
where Y =
 J
j=1 Yj is world income and sh = Yh/Y is the share of
country h in world income.
We next show that if Vij is decomposable in a particular way,
and transport costs are symmetric (i.e., τij = τji for all i and j),
then (16) yields the generalized gravity equation that has been
derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their speciﬁca-
tion satisﬁes these conditions. Importantly, however, there are
other cases of interest, less restrictive than the Anderson and
van Wincoop speciﬁcation, that satisfy them too. Therefore, our
derivation of the gravity equation shows that it applies under
wider circumstances and, in particular, when there is productivity
heterogeneity across ﬁrms and ﬁrms bear ﬁxed costs of exporting.
Under these circumstances only a fraction of the ﬁrms export:
those with the highest productivity. Finally, note that our general
formulation—without decomposability—is more relevant for em-
pirical analysis because, unlike previous formulations, it enables
bilateral trade ﬂows to equal zero. This ﬂexibility is important be-
cause, as we have explained in the Introduction, there are many
zero bilateral trade ﬂows in the data.
Consider the following:
DECOMPOSABILITY ASSUMPTION. Vij is decomposable as follows:
Vij =
 
ϕIM,iϕEX,jϕij
 1−ε ,482 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
where ϕIM,i depends only on the parameters of the importing
country, ϕEX,j depends only on the parameters of the exporting
country, and ϕij = ϕji for all i, j.
In this decomposition, only the symmetric terms ϕij depend on the
joint identity of the importing and exporting countries; all other
parameters do not.
To illustrate circumstances in which the decomposability as-
sumption is satisﬁed, ﬁrst consider a situation where the ﬁxed
costs fij are very small, so that aij > aH for all i, j. That is, the
lowest productivity level that makes exporting proﬁtable, 1/aij,
is lower than the lowest productivity level in the support of G(·),
1/aH. Under these circumstances all ﬁrms export and Vij is the
same for every country pair i, j.55 Alternatively, suppose that pro-
ductivity 1/a has a Pareto distribution with shape k and aL = 0.
That is, G(a) = (a/aH)k for 0 ≤ a ≤ aH. Moreover, let either fij de-
pend only on the identity of the exporter, so that fij = fj,o rl e tt h e
ﬁxed costs be symmetric, so that fij = fji. Then Vij satisﬁes the
decomposability assumption and in every country j only a fraction
of ﬁrms export to country i.56
Using the decomposability property and symmetry require-
ments τij = τji and ϕij = ϕji, we obtain57
(17)
Mij
Y
= sisj
 
τijϕij
QiQj
 1−ε
,
where the values of Qj are solved from
(18) Q
1−ε
j =
 
h
 
τjhϕjh
Qh
 1−ε
sh.
This is essentially the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) system.
Evidently, the solution of the Qjs depends only on income shares
55. More precisely, Vij =
  aH
aL a1−εdG(a).
56. Under these conditions Vij = k(aij)k−ε+1/(aH)k(k− ε + 1) and either aij =
[cj fj/(1 − α)]1/(1−ε)/(τijcj/αPi), so that fj becomes part of EX, j whereas τij be-
comespartofϕij,oraij = [cj fij/(1 − α)]1/(1−ε)/(τijcj/αPi),sothat fij andτij become
part of ϕij.
57. Decomposability allows us to rewrite (16) as
(20) Mij =
YiYj
Y
 
τijϕij
Qi ˆ Qj
 1−ε
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and transport costs and possibly on a constant in Vij that is em-
bodied in the ϕijs. However, an upward shift of this constant raises
the product QiQj proportionately and therefore has no effect on
Mij. Therefore, imports of country i from j as a share of world in-
come, which equal imports of country j from i as a share of world
income, depend only on the structure of trade costs and the size
distribution of countries. Bilateral imports as a fraction of world
income are proportional to the product of the two countries’ shares
in world income, with the factor of proportionality depending on
the structure of trading costs and the worldwide distribution of
relative country size.
The decomposability assumption is too restrictive, however.
It implies that if imports of country i from j equal zero, that
is, Vij = 0, then one of the ϕs( ϕIM,i, ϕEX,j,o rϕij) must be inﬁnite,
because ε>1. In other words, some trade costs, either at the coun-
try or bilateral level, must be inﬁnite in order to explain zero trade
ﬂows. Our framework, which does not rely on this decomposability
assumption, is much more general, as it can explain the prevalent
zero trade ﬂows based on ﬁnite trade costs (which can then be es-
timated). Furthermore, the gravity speciﬁcation (17) based on the
decomposability assumption cannot explain the asymmetries in
bilateral trade ﬂows (which must then stem from country ﬁxed ef-
fects). In the case of zero bilateral trade in only one direction, this
would impose either that the importer does not import from any
other country or that the exporter does not export to any other
where Qi = Pi/ϕIM,i and
(21) ˆ Q1−ε
j =
 
h
 
τhjϕhj
Qh
 1−ε
sh .
In addition, (7) and (15) imply
Q1−ε
i =
 
h
 chτihϕih
α
 1−ε
Nh
 
ϕEX,h
 1−ε ,
sj =
 cj
α
 1−ε
Nj
 
ϕEX,j
 1−ε ˆ Q1−ε
j .
Therefore,
(22) Q1−ε
j =
 
h
 
τjhϕjh
ˆ Qh
 1−ε
sh .
Equations (21) and (22) together with symmetry conditions τij = τji and ϕij = ϕji
then imply that Qj = ˆ Qj for every j. As a result, (20) and (21) yield the equations
in the text.484 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
country. This is clearly inconsistent with the data. As we have
explained in the introduction, most countries trade only with a
fraction of the countries in the world economy: neither with all of
them nor with none of them. In the case of positive trade ﬂows in
both directions, (17) imposes that all bilateral trade asymmetries
stem from the country ﬁxed-effects. This is also inconsistent with
the observed pattern of trade, as documented in the second panel
of Table V. Furthermore, that table documents that those asym-
metries are highly correlated with the asymmetric pattern of zero
trade ﬂows (which would be inconsistent with (17)). Indeed, this is
the main logic behind our more general theoretical model and em-
pirical implementation: the decision to export to a foreign country
is not independent of the volume of exports, and thus that the
pattern of trading partners and trading volumes must jointly be
analyzed. For these reasons we use the less restrictive equations
(4)–(7) for estimation purposes.
APPENDIX III
We explain in this Appendix the computation of the counter-
factuals in Section VIII. To this end, consider an observed change
in the bilateral trade costs from dij to d 
ij.58 The new predicted esti-
mates of the probability of trade ˆ ρ 
ij and ˆ z∗ 
ij =  −1(ˆ ρ 
ij) are obtained
in a straightforward way from the ﬁrst stage estimated Probit
equation by replacing dij with d 
ij. We next need to obtain a con-
sistent estimate of z∗ 
ij conditional on the observed trade status of
j and i (trade or no trade) when trade costs are dij, given that
we do not observe the trade status under the new trade costs d 
ij.
This will replace ˆ ¯ z∗
ij in our equations. Originally we were only con-
cerned with computing ˆ ¯ z∗
ij for country pairs with active trade, that
is, with Tij = 1. But now we also need to consider country pairs
that do not trade under costs dij but might trade under costs d 
ij.
For this reason we need to examine two cases.
III. A. Country Pairs Observed Trading
First, we note that the unobserved trade costs η∗
ij are not
affected by the change in trade costs dij.59 If we knew whether a
58. As in our previous derivations, dij can represent any given observable
variable trade cost.
59. That is, we seek a ceteris paribus counterfactual prediction for a direct
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country pair traded under d 
ij,s a yT  
ij, then we could construct a
newestimateforη∗
ij,sa yη∗ 
ij,conditionalonboth Tij and T  
ij.Absent
this additional information, our best estimate for η∗
ij is conditional
on Tij and is still given by ˆ ¯ η∗
ij = E[η∗
ij | .,Tij = 1] = φ(ˆ z∗
ij)/ (ˆ z∗
ij).
Thus, when Tij = 1, our best estimate for ˆ z∗ 
ij is given by
ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij = E
 
z∗ 
ij | .,Tij = 1
 
= ˆ z∗ 
ij + φ
 
ˆ z∗
ij
 
/ 
 
ˆ z∗
ij
 
.
Again, note that the new distance cost d 
ij is used to compute
the new ˆ z∗ 
ij but not the bias correction for η∗
ij.I fˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij < 0, then we
predict that j no longer exports to i. Because ˆ ¯ z∗
ij > 0, this can only
happen when d 
ij > dij (a scenario we will not explicitly consider).
If ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij > 0, then we predict that the country pair continues to trade
(this must be the case when d 
ij < dij). This new value of ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij can
then be used in conjunction with the second stage estimates to
predict the response of trade ﬂows at the extensive margin. In the
case of the NLS estimation, this is ˆ ¯ w∗ 
ij = ln{exp[δ(ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij)] − 1} (and
ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij) for the polynomial approximation). The overall predicted
trade response ˆ m 
ij is given by the ﬁtted value from the estimated
second stage equation (14) using the new values for ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij and d 
ij:
(19) ˆ m 
ij = ˆ β0 + ˆ λj + ˆ χi + ˆ γd 
ij + ˆ ¯ w∗ 
ij + ˆ βuη ˆ ¯ η∗
ij.
In the case of the polynomial approximation, ˆ β0 + ˆ ¯ w∗ 
ij is replaced
by ˆ ν(ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij).
III. B. Country Pairs Not Observed Trading
We now show how our model can be used to determine which
nontrading country pairs are predicted to start trading under
costs d 
ij, and the associated new predicted trade ﬂow. The ﬁrst
stage yields a predicted ˆ ρ 
ij and ˆ z∗ 
ij for all country pairs under d 
ij,
including the nontrading country pairs. We now need to obtain
a consistent estimate for z∗ 
ij for these country pairs, conditional
on Tij = 0. We start by expanding the deﬁnition for ¯ η∗
ij to include
the country pairs that do not trade: ¯ η∗
ij = E[η∗
ij | .,Tij]. (This was
previously deﬁned only when Tij = 1.) When Tij = 0, this is given
by
¯ η∗
ij = E
 
η∗
ij | .,Tij = 0
 
= E
 
η∗
ij | .,η∗
ij < −z∗
ij
 
=
−φ(z∗
ij)
1 −  (z∗
ij)
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because η∗
ij is distributed standard normal. Hence, ˆ ¯ η∗
ij, our consis-
tent estimate for E[η∗
ij | .,Tij], is constructed as
ˆ ¯ η∗
ij =

       
       
−φ
 
ˆ z∗
ij
 
1 −  
 
ˆ z∗
ij
  if Tij = 0,
φ
 
ˆ z∗
ij
 
 
 
ˆ z∗
ij
  if Tij = 1.
Using this new expanded deﬁnition for ˆ ¯ η∗
ij, our previous deﬁnition
for ˆ ¯ z∗
ij = ˆ z∗
ij + ˆ ¯ η∗
ij now provides a consistent estimate for E[z∗
ij | Tij],
which now includes the case for country pairs with Tij = 0. Note
that,byconstruction, ˆ ¯ z∗
ij mustbenegativewhenever Tij = 0(recall
that ˆ ¯ z∗
ij > 0 whenever Tij = 1).
When trade costs change to d 
ij, we obtain a new ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij for
country pairs with Tij = 0 in a way similar to that for Tij = 1:
ˆ ¯ z∗ 
ij = ˆ z∗ 
ij + ˆ ¯ η∗
ij, where we do not adjust ˆ ¯ η∗
ij for the new value of the
trade costs.60 Whenever ˆ ¯ z∗
ij > 0, our model predicts that j exports
to i under the trade costs d 
ij. For these country pairs, the new
predicted trade ﬂow ˆ m 
ij can be predicted in a similar way to that
for all the other trading country pairs using (19) along with the
newly constructed ˆ ¯ z∗
ij.
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